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COMMENTS

lated in unambiguous language, that language is itself the best index of legislative intent.
Personally, I believe that the Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley law is so clear
and unambiguous in its expression as to make reference to extraneous documentation unnecessary. Nevertheless that part of the extraneous documentation and external circumstances which has the highest quality (the evils to be
remedied, the conference reports, the senate reports, the explanations given by
Senators Taft, Byrd and Ball) confirm the construction which I have made.
That another view ever became popular; or that I myself had the initial
impression that Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley law was meant to place restrictions upon the United lIine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement
Funds, I can only attribute to certain false emphases given by the labor law
services and the newspapers which' copied them.

EMLARGEM1ENT OF TORT LIABILITY OF CEHARITABLE
HOSPITALS IN NEW YORK
Legal scholars are almost unanimous in the opinion that charities should be
no more exempt from liability for the negligence of their employees than are
private business corporations and individuals 1 No such unanimity is to be
found among the courts. 2 An exceedingly small minority of jurisdictions have
imposed full liability.3 On the other hand, only the advocates of the "trust
1. COOLEY, TORTS 126 (Student's ed. 1930); 1L'awER, Tonus § 294 (1933); Pnoc-,
TORTS § 10S (1941); Appleman, The Tort Liability of CharitableInstitutions, 22 A. B. A. J.
43 (1936); Feezer, Tort Liability of Charities, 76 U. or P.,. L. REv. 191 (1923); Zollman,
Damage Liability of Charitable Institutions, 19 MIcHr. L. REv. 395 (1920). Btl see McCaskill, Respondeat Superior as Applied in New York. to Quasi-Public and Eleemosynary
Corporations,6 CoR. L. Q. 56 (1920).
2. See the opinion of Rutledge, A. J., in Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 310
(App. D. C. 1942), of which it has been said that it " . . constitutes a document which
should be of invaluable aid to any state legislature contemplating a change in this particular sphere of the law." Obiter Dicta, 12 ForD. L. REv. S9, 91 (1943).
3. Muliner v. German Evangelical Synod, 144 Minn. 393, 175 N. W. 699 (1920) (pneumonia patient leaped to his death as a result of nurse's failure to exercise nccc-ary s-perv.ision); Welch v. Freshie Mem. Hosp., 90 N. H. 337, 9 A. 2d 761 (1939) (X-ray technician rendered negative report on condition of patient's ankle. Subsequent examination
at another hospital revealed broken bones which had failed to knit properly. Held, hospital
was liable if X-ray technician's negligence was proximate cause of plaintiff's injury); cf.
Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 6S So. 4 (1915) (court, in holding the
charity liable to a paying patient, expressly reserved its opinion as to non-paying patients);
Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 94 Utah 460, 73 P. 2d 645 (1933)
(although the question was decided on the pleadings, the court stated that a hospital
whose general purposes were charitable could be held liable for the death of a paying
patient). Glavin v. Rhode Island Hosp., 12 R. I. 411 (1379), advocated the adoption of
a doctrine closely akin to that now in effect in New York (see note 24 infra), but passage
of R. I. Gen. Laws 1933, c. 116, § 95, restored immunity to the charitable institutions.
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fund" theory 4 purport to grant complete immunity,r denying recovery to
stranger, servant and beneficiary alike. Even here, however, exceptions have
been made in special instances. 6 The remaining jurisdictions have shown
marked uniformity in permitting recovery to strangers 7 and servants,8 and
also to beneficiaries who have sustained injuries at the hands of employees
,carelessly selected. 9
The Conflict
The real conflict exists in the decisions covering the rights of beneficiaries
for torts committed upon them by employees who have been presumptively

selected with care. In respect to charitable hospitals, courts have but rarely 0

distinguished between paying and non-paying patients, the majority view being
that payment for services received or treatments rendered will not impose liability where it would not have been imposed otherwise."
4. Two reasons are most commonly advanced in support of the theory: "To give damages out of a trust fund would not be to apply it to those objects whom the author of the
fund had in view, but would be to divert it to a completely different purpose," Herots'
Hosp. v. Ross, 12 Clark & F. 507, 513, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508, 1510 (1846); and ". . If the
property of the charity was depleted by the payment of damages its usefulness might be
either impaired or wholly destroyed . . . ," Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147, 149, 78 N. E.
855 (1906), relying upon McDonald v. Mass. Gen'l Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
5. In a leading case among advocates of the trust fund theory, Roosen v. Peter Bent
Brigham Hosp., 235 Mass. 66, 126 N. E. 392 (1920), deceased, a paying patient, was given
a deadly poison in lieu of Epsom salts. Held, to permit recovery would be unlawfully to
381, 75 N. E. 991
divert the trust fund. See Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill.
(1905) (student lost eye through negligence of professor) ; Greatrex v. Evangelical Deaconess
IHosp., 261 Mich. 327, 246 N. W. 137 (1933) (plaintiff's baby was given to another through
negligence of nurse and never recovered); Gregory v. Salem General Hosp., 175 Ore.
464, 153 P. 2d 837 (1944) (nurse negligently placed hot water bottle in plaintiff's bed).
6. O'Connor v. Boulder Colo. San. Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. 2d 835 (1939) (indemnity
insurance) ; Peden v. Furnam U., 155 S. C. 1, 151 S. E. 907 (1930) (creating a nuisance) ;
cf. Ratliffe v. Wesley Hosp. & Nurses' Training School, 135 Kan. 306, 10 P. 2d 859
(1932) (negligent selection of employees). Compare McKay v. Morgan Mem. Co-op Industries & Stores, Inc., 272 Mass. 121, 172 N. E. 68 (1930) udth Reavey v. Guild of St.
Agnes, 284 Mass. 300, 187 N. E. 557 (1933).
7. E.g., Henry W. Putnam Mem. Hosp. v. Allen, 34 F. 2d 927 (C. C. A. 2d 1929);
Andrews v. Y. M. C. A., 226 Iowa 374, 284 N. W. 186 (1939).
8. Gable v. Salvation Army, 186 Okla. 687, 100 P. 2d 244 (1940); cf. Bruce v. Central
Meth. Epis. Church, 147 Mich 230, 110 N. W. 951 (1907).
9. Georgia Bap. Hosp. v. Smith, 37 Ga. App. 92, 139 S. E. 101 (1927) (anaesthetist);
Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home & Hosp., 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N. E. 287 (1922) (student assistant) ; Magnuson v. Swedish Hosp., 99 Wash. 399, 169 Pac. 828 (1918) (nurse).
10. See, e.g., Silva v. Providence Hosp. of Oakland, 14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P. 2d 798 (1939);
Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940).
11. Southern Methodist Hosp. and Sanitarium v. Wilson, 45 Ariz. 507, 46 P. 2d 118
(1935); cf. Morton v. Savannah Hosp., 148 Ga. 438, 96 S. E. 887 (1918); see Susmann
v. Y. M. C. A., 101 Wash. 487, 489, 172 Pac. 554, 556 (i918).
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Theories upon Which Immunity Has Been Granted

Until recently the courts generally have been determined in their efforts
to protect the charity from liability to beneficiaries injured at the hands of its
employees. Varying grounds have been advanced to support such a policy.
The "waiver" doctrine,' 2 once extant in New York' 3 but now replaced by the
"independent contractor" doctrine,' 4 is still in force in several jurisdictions.'5
This approach, however, may not with consistency prevent recovery for injuries sustained by strangers and employees.' 0 The "trust fund" theory, referred to above,' 7 continues to have its adherents. The view that the nonprofit characteristic of the institution precludes the application of the rule

of respozdeat szperior has received some support.' s Still another position taken
has been that the charity is analogous to a governmental agency and performing a governmental function.' When all other explanations have proved unsatisfactory, exemption has been granted on the broad, inarticulate and, it is
submitted, unsatisfactory ground of public policyY0
12. Patient or student who accepts the benefits is said to waive impliedly the right to
hold the charity liable for injuries sustained at the hands of its employees.
13. Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N. Y. 233, 92 N. E. 626 (1910) (charity held liable for injuries sustained by mechanic engaged in repairing boiler on its premies) ; Collins v. N. Y. Post Graduate Med. School, 59 App. Div. 62, 69 N. Y. Supp. 106 (2d Dcp't
1901) (charity freed from liability for negligence of surgeon in performing operation on
one who had voluntarily requested treatment); see Hamburger v. Cornell University,
240 N. Y. 328, 339, 340, 143 N. E. 539, 543 (1925), in which the court, s7peahing through
Cardozo, J., stated: "Immunity, if it exists in such conditions, would come from the
recognition of what is known as the 'waiver' doctrine, or something akin thereto." Contra:
Shehan v. North Country Community Hosp., 273 N. Y. 163, 7 N. E. 2d 28 (1933) (sce
note 22 infra); see Phillips v. Buffalo General Hosp., 239 N. Y. 13, 189, 146 N. E. 199,
200 (1924), wherein the court expressed its dissatisfaction with the "waiver" doctrine by
saying: "We are reluctant to permit an affirmance of the judgment to pass as an acceptance of the theory that defendant's exemption from liability must rest on the waiver doctrine."
14. See text accompanying note 21, et seq.
15. See, e.g., Mikota v. Sisters of Mercy, 133 Iowa 1378, 163 N. W. 219 (1918); Williams' Adm'x v. Church Home for Females, 223 Ky. 355, 3 S. W. 2d 753 (1928) (court
affirmed three doctrines, i.e., public policy, trust fund, and implied waiver); Hospital of
St. Vincent of Paul v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S. E. 13 (1914) (stranger p2rmitted
to recover since doctrine of implied waiver held to apply to bcneficiaries only).
16. E.g., in Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation, 128 App. Div. 214, 112 N. Y. Supp.
566 (2d Dep't 1903), the court, while recognizing the existence of the doctrine, held that
it had no application to the case before it (stranger run over by ambulance) and reverszd
a judgment dismissing the complaint.
17. See notes 4 and 5 supra.
18. Paterlin v. Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 247 Fed. 639 (C. C. A. 3d 1918); Parks v.
Northwestern University, 218 Il. 331, 75 N. E. 991 (1905).
19. Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess Soc., 218 Wis. 169, 260 N. W. 476 (1935).
20. D'Amato v. Orange Memorial Hosp., 101 N. J. L. 61, 127 At. 340 (1925).
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"Independent Contractor" Doctrine in New York
Despite the view taken by some2 1 that Slheehan v. North Country Community Hospita 22 negatived completely the charity's immunity from liability
to a beneficiary for the torts of its employees, subsequent decisions23 have
clearly affirmed New York's commitment to the "independent contractor" doctrine of immunity 24 when privately 25 conducted charities20 are involved. Briefly
stated, New York's postion is as follows: if the tort is committed by one engaged in the performance of professional, as distinguished from merely admin21. See Lee v. Glens Falls Hosp., 265 App. Div. 607, 612, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 169, 174
(3d Dep't 1943) (dissenting opinion), aff'd, 291 N. Y. 526, 50 N. E. 2d 651 (1943), appeal
denied, 291 N. Y. 670, 51 N. E. 2d 940 (1943); Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d
810, 819 (App. D. C. 1942).
22. 273 N. Y. 163, 7 N. E. 2d 28 (1938). In that case, plaintiff, a paying patient in
the hospital of defendant, a charitable corporation, was injured in a collision between
the ambulance of the defendant and another vehicle. The charitable hospital was held liable for the negligence of a mere servant, i.e., the ambulance driver.
23. Lee v. Glens Falls Hosp., 265 App. Div. 607, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 169 (3d Dep't 1943),
aff'd, 291 N. Y. 526, 50 N. E. 2d 651 (1943), appeal denied, 291 N. Y. 670, 51 N. E. 2d 940
(1943) (see text accompanying note 29 infra) ; Steinert v. Brunswick Home, 172 Misc, 787
16 N. Y. S. 2d 83 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 259 App. Div. 1018, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 459 (2d Dep't
1940), appeal denied, 260 App. Div. 810, 22 N. Y. S. 2d 822 (2d Dep't 1940) (paying patient denied recovery for injuries suffered as result of nurse's negligence in preparing
wrong solution for injection on ground that her act was non-professional); Andrews v.
Roosevelt Hosp., 259 App. Div. 733, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 447 (2d Dep't 1940), reargumcnt
denied, Re Petrides' Estate, 259 App. Div. 831, 19 N. Y. S. 2d 1022 (2d Dep't 1940)
(patient, left unattended by interne and orderly, died as result of fall from table In examination room. The hospital was held not liable since failure to attend patient was negligence in performance of non-administrative act).
24. The relationship between the hospital and its physicians was described by Cardozo,
J., in Schloendorff v. New York Hosp., 211 N. Y. 125, 129, 105 N. E. 92, 93 (1914),
as follows: "It is said that this relation is not one of master and servant, but that the
physician occupies the position, so to speak, of an independent contractor, following a
separate calling, liable, of course, for his own wrongs to the patient whom he undertakes
to serve, but involving the hospital in no liability if due care has been taken in his selection. . . " The learned Judge, further on in his opinion, made the following observation
in respect to nurses: "It is true, I think, of nurses as of physicians, that in treating a
patient they are not acting as the servants of the hospital." Id. at 132, 105 N. E. at 94.
25. See note 44 infra.
26. It would seem that the "independent contractor" doctrine, logically applied, should
lead to the same result in cases involving hospitals conducted for profit. See Renouf v.
N. Y. Central R. R., 254 N. Y. 349, 351, 173 N.E. 218, 219 (1930), in which Pound, J., speaking for the court, said: "This rule of relationship between employer and nurse is not
limited in its application to charitable corporations, although it has often been applied
to relieve such corporations from liability for the negligent acts of physicians and nurses
employed by them in the treatment of patients." But cf. Post v. Crown Heights Hosp.,
173 Misc. 250, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 409 (Sup. Ct. 1940), wherein a non-charitable hospital was
held liable for injuries to a patient resulting from an interne's negligent administration
of an injection.
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istrative, duties, if there is no negligence in the selection of the employee, and
if the hospital believes in good faith, "and without notice to the contrary, that
no tort is being committed or contemplated, liability may not be imposed upon
the hospital
however negligent the wrongdoer may be in the performance of
27
his duty.
Whether or not the employee is to be classified as an independent contractor "... . is determined by the nature of the work he is employed to do rather
than the payroll designation of his position."2 3 The determination of the
"nature" of the act has resulted in some finely spun distinctions. In Lee V.
Glens Falls Hospital'" a paying patient was injured when she fell from a bed
upon which sideboards had been attached, during the temporary absence of a

nurse employed by the hospital. The Appellate Division, two justices dissenting, held her act to be professional in nature and therefore not such as would

cast liability upon the hospital. But in Ranelli v. Society of Xcta York Hospitals

°

where a head nurse failed to attach sideboards to a patient's bed, after

having concluded that they were necessary, the hospital was held liable for
her negligence on the ground that the attachment of sideboards to a bed was

a purely administrative act. Her decision to attach was said to be of a professional nature; her failure to attach was purely administrative. With respect

to as routine an act as placing a hot water bottle in a bed, it was held in
27. Schloendorff v. New York Hosp., 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914); cf. Hendrickson v. Hodkin, 276 N. Y. 252, 257, 11 N. E. 2d 899, 901 (1937), cited by the Appellate Division in Necolayff v. Genesee Hosp., 270 App. Div. 643, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 832 (4th
Dep't 1946), aff'd without opinion, 296 N. Y. 936, 73 N. E. 2d 117 (1947). In the Hendrickson case, supra, the Court of Appeals reversed a dismissal of the complaint as to the defendant non-charitable hospital and observed, per Hobbs, J.: "The evidence . . . justified
the . . . finding that the hospital admitted appellant hnouing that the purpoze of his
being there was for an improper treatment by a layman . .." (italics supplied); and (at
25S, 11 N. E. 2d at 902): "... . the basis of liability is not the negligence of the doctor or
nurse in charge, but the wrongful conduct of the executive manager and superintendent acting
within the scope of his authority. . . " citing the Schloendorif case, supra. Dillon v.
Rockaway Beach Hosp., 284 N. Y. 176, 181, 30 N. E. 2d 373, 375 (1940), alro cited
by the Appellate Division in the Necolayff case, supra, is dearly distinguizhable as the
Court of Appeals held, by a unanimous court, that ". . . the act is of a kind performed
by a servant, and it is undisputed that such is the character of the act in the case at bar."
2S. (Italics supplied). Phillips v. Buffalo General Hosp., 239 N. Y. ISS, 1C0, 146 N. E.
199, 200 (1924) ; Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hosp., 284 N. Y. 176, 30 N. E. 2d 373 (1940).
29. 265 App. Div. 607, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 169 (3d Dep't 1943), afl'd, 291 N. Y. 526, 50
N. E. 2d 651 (1943), appeal denied, 291 N. Y. 670, 51 N. E. 2d 940 (1943).
30. 49 N. Y. S. 2d 893 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd on reduction of verdict, 269 App Div. 905,
56 N. Y. S. 2d 481 (2d Dep't 1945), aff'd, 295 N. Y. 850, 67 N. E. 2d 257 (1946);

cf. Petry v. Nassau Hosp., 267 App. Div. 996, 4S N. Y. S. 2d 227 (2d Dep't 1944) (patient
left unattended on a table that had no sides on it but it did not appear that a decision as
to their necessity had been made by anyone); Bickford v. Peck Memorial Hop., 266 App.

Div. 875, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 20 (2d Dep't 1943) (maternity patient injured in fall from bed.
It was held to be a question of fact as to whether defendant should have supplied a bed

with sideboards).
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Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital3' that such an act was nursing and therefore non-administrative though performed by an orderly. But, in a more recent case, a nurse's act of placing a hot water bottle in a bed for the purpose
of preventing shock to a patient just. operated upon was held to be administrative since the patient was not in'the bed when the bottle was placed therein.32
Necolayff v. Genesee Hospital
3
The case of Necolayff v. Genesee Hospital,"
recently affirmed without opinion
by the Court of Appeals spotlights more vividly the extent to which courts
will go in their reasoning when they seek to adhere to the principle of stare
decisis on the one hand and yet provide relief for obvious wrong on the other.
In the Necolayff case the original plaintiff34 was a paying patient at the hospital of defendant. She had retained her own surgeon, physician and nurse. On
the second day preceding her scheduled discharge from the hospital, a blood
transfusion, prescribed for another patient by the latter's private physician,
was mistakenly administered to plaintiff, over her protest, by an interne and
nurse, employees of the hospital. Resulting injuries to plaintiff were described,
in part, as severe nervous shock leading to a subsequent, three-month confinement in a state institution for the insane. The trial court decided as a matter
of law that the charity was liable for the tortious conduct of the interne and
nurse. The Appellate Division, one justice dissenting, affirmed upon the ground
that the professional nature of the employees' work had ceased upon their
entry into the wrong room and, therefore, that the hospital was liable under
the rule of respondeat superior.
The Appellate Division conceded that the interne and nurse "... were properly qualified and were assigned to do some professional work." 3 It also conceded that no degree of error on the part of the interne and nurse could have
imposed liability on the hospital had such error been committed while they
were administering the transfusion to the proper patient. 8 The transfusion,
however, was not administered to the proper patient. That the employees in
the Necolayff case were guilty of negligence, if not trespass and assault, is not
to be disputed.37 But upon what ground can the liability of the hospital be predi31.

239 N. Y. 188, 146 N. E. 199 (1924).

32. Iacono v. N. Y. Poly. Med. School and Hosp., 260 App. Div. 955, 58 N. Y. S. 2d
244 (2d Dep't 1945), aff'd, 296 N. Y. 502, 68 N. E. 2d 450 (1946).
33. 270 App. Div. 648, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 832 (4th Dep't 1946), afl'd wuthlout opinion,
296 N. Y. 936, 73 N. E. 2d 117 (1947).
34. Subsequent to the decision of the Appellate Division, the. original plaintiff died,
whereupon the administrator of her estate was substituted in her place.
35.

270 App. Div. 648, 653, 61 N.

Y. S. 2d 832, 836 (4th Dep't 1946), aff'd without

opinion, 296 N. Y. 936, 73 N. E. 2d 117 (1947).
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid. The court then said: "To avoid such negligence or act of misconduct would
be the duty of the hospital, and yet here such negligence and misconduct were committed
by the very persons whom the hospital employed for certain duties and thus gave them
access to the rooms and persons of patients." Ibid. As to the first portion of the quoted
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cated? The Appellate Division solved this by holding that "Their [the employees'] entrance into the wrong room caused the professional nature of their
errand to cease." Thus, by a purely accidental and, it would seem, irrelevant
fact, a concededly professional act (the administering of a blood transfusion)
was transformed into one purely administrative. It is extremely difficult to
reconcile this holding with that in Scidoendorff v. Nc York Hospitaps in
which a paying patient who had consented to an ether examination but who
had informed physicians and nurses employed by the charitable hospital of her
refusal to undergo an operation of any sort was denied recovery for injuries
sustained as the result of the unauthorized operation. Both in the Schlocndorff
case and in the Necolayff case the wrong complained of was not merely negligence but trespass and, it is submitted, no more notice was chargeable to the
New York Hospital in the former case than was chargeable to the Genesee
Hospital in the latter.3 9
As for the possibility in the Necolayff case that the hospital had been negligent in its duty of supervision, the Appellate Division itself acknowledges that
"Through some mistake (and. the record does not show what istake or whosc
mistake) the interne Moody entered Mrs. Necolayff's room and gave her this
transfusion."' 40
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the fact that the Sheehan case" did not go so far towards
imposing full liability as was first thought,4 recent cases have disclosed a
marked tendency on the part of New York courts to hold the charity liable
whenever possible.3 Only in the light of this trend is it possible to understand the result reached in the Necolayff case. Unfortunately, the distinctions
statement, i.e., the duty of the hospital, see note 40 infra, and accompanying text; as to the
second, i.e., that the tort was committed by the 'very persons" to whom the hofpital had
given access to the persons and rooms of patients, it is submitted that it is extrcmely difficult to conceive of anyone more likely to commit it.
38. 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914); see, also, note 27 supra.
39. Moreover, the language employed in the Schloendorff case does not lend itself to an
interpretation which would support the court's reasoning in the more recent dcion. Thus,
the court in the Schloendorff case said (at 131, 105 N. E. at 94): "One or both of thoze
physicians ... ordered that an operation be performed on her in disregard of her instructions. The administrative staff of the hospital believing in good faith that the order was
a proper one, and without notice to the contrary, gave to the op2rating surgeons the
facilities of the surgical ward. The operation was then performed. The wrong was not
that of the hospital; it was that of physicians, who were not the defendant's zrvants,
but were pursuing an independent calling. . . If, in serving their patient, they violated
her commands, the responsibility is not the defendant's; it is theirs."
40. (Italics supplied.) 270 App. Div. 643, 651, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 32, 3834 (4th Dep't 1946).
41. 273 N. Y. 163, 7 N. E. 2d 23 (1933).
42. See notes 21, 22 and 23 supra, and accompanying text.
43. See cases cited in notes 22, 30 and 32 supra. For a discussion of the liability of
churches for injuries sustained therein, see a series of three article commencing in N. Y. L. J..
Oct. 17, 1945, p. 920, col 1.
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which the courts have made in their effort to reach the desired result has led to
decisions which if not altogether unsound are at least questionable. The court in
the Necolayff case abandoned the test heretofore uniformly applied in deternining whether an act was administrative or professional (the nature of the act
itself) and substituted as the controlling factor the place of its performance
or, at least, the circumstances surrounding it. While perhaps doing justice
in this most recent instance, such strained judicial rationalization renders more
uncertain this branch of the law. If public policy demands the imposition of
full liability upon' all charitable institutions, the legislature rather than the
judiciary should provide the necessary relief. 44 Litigants and lawyers should
not be left to depend upon the nice and, it would seem, almost imperceptible
distinctions which the courts have seemingly marked out in an attempt to
reconcile the rights of the injured patient with the public service performed
by our hospitals.
44. The State, in respect to the institutions which it maintains, has expressly waived Its
sovereign immunity. COURT Or CLAimS ACT § 12-a, N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 467, now § 8, N. Y.
Laws 1939, c. 860, Bernadine v. City of New York, 294 N. Y. 361, 62 N. E. 2d 604
(1945); Holmes v. County of Erie, 291 N. Y. 798, 53 N. E. 2d 369 (1944); Bloom v.
Jewish Board of Guardians, 286 N. Y. 349, 36 N. E. 2d 617 (1941), 11 FORD. L. R.V.
101 (1942); see Paige v. State of New York, 269 N. Y. 352, 357, 199 N. E. 617, 619
(1935) (dissenting opinion). As Loughran, J., speaking for the Court of Appeals in Sheehan
v. North Country Community Hosp., 273 N. Y. 163, 166, 7 N. E. 2d 38, 39 (1938), so
aptly remarked, ". . . the now declared public policy of the State is that persons damaged
by the torts of those acting as its officers and employees need not contribute their losses
to the purposes of government."

